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Abstract 
 
We study how salient group identity, created through competition between 
students from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning 
impact competitive behavior. Our experiment employs a simple all-pay auction 
within and between two university subject pools. We find that when competing 
against their peers, students within the lower tier university bid more aggressively 
than students within the top-tier university. Also, students from the lower tier 
university, in particular women, bid more aggressively when competing against 
students from the top-tier university. These findings, interpreted through a 
theoretical model incorporating both group identity and differential value of 
winning, suggest that students at the lower tier university have a stronger group 
identity as well as higher desire to win.  
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1. Introduction 
The higher education system is composed of many highly diverse universities of various 
sizes and quality which are in constant competition between each other (Clotfelter, 1999; De 
Fraja and Iossa, 2002). These universities pay substantial amounts of money to attract faculty 
who would enhance the university’s prestige (Melguizo and Strober, 2007) and head coaches 
who would make more successful sports franchises (Kahn, 2007). As a result of these efforts to 
vertically differentiate, there is more competition among students to enter more prestigious 
universities (Epple et al., 2006). This entry of competitive students in turn increases the 
competition between students within universities (Barsky, 2002). 
The purpose of this study is to examine theoretically and empirically how group identity 
and the desire to win influence student competition between and within universities. Our data 
come from an experiment conducted at two different universities located in the same city. 
Shenzhen University is ranked roughly among the top 100 universities and University Town is 
ranked among the top 10 universities in China.1 Students at both universities participated in a 
two-player all-pay auction. Before choosing their bids, students learned the school identity of 
their opponent, which was either the same or different than their own school. Our theory allows 
us to separate the effect of group identity on competition between universities and the effect of 
the value of winning on competition within universities.  
We hypothesized that competition between universities, regardless of differences in rank, 
would be enhanced by group identity.2 According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 
                                                 
 
1 University Town is the graduate campus of Peking, Tsinghua and HIT Universities. Our subjects are from the 
Peking and Tsinghua universities, which are generally recognized as the top-two universities in China. Though HIT 
is of lower rank in its undergraduate student population, the graduate school at University Town is of similar 
prestige. For simplicity, we will refer to the University Town campus as a university. 
2 We restrict our attention to school identity which is the most salient group identity in our setting.  
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1979), a salient group identity may cause individuals to put themselves and others into different 
categories based on perceived similarities and differences, leading to discrimination between in-
group and out-group members. The degree of discrimination depends on the saliency of group 
identity.3 Both theoretical (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005) and experimental studies (Chen 
and Li, 2009) have supported the predictions of the social identity theory. For example, 
experimental studies show that enhanced group identity increases kindness and pro-social 
behavior towards in-group members, while inducing more hostile behavior towards out-group 
individuals (Abbink et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Halevy et al., 2012).4 The implication of the 
latter is that salient group identity may stiffen the competition between different social groups, 
such as universities. 
Group identity, however, cannot explain variations in the level of competition between 
students within the same university. Enhanced group identity should increase pro-social behavior 
towards in-group members, thus reducing (not increasing) competitiveness of students. 
Variations in the level of competition within different universities could be driven by many 
factors, both monetary and non-monetary, related to ability or related to temperament. There is 
significant interest in the non-ability/temperamental characteristics, e.g., level of ambition, by 
which schools select students and how these characteristics may complement or substitute for 
ability; see the literature spawned by Dale and Krueger (2002). There is evidence that non-
monetary rewards are important for students (Biggs, 1982). Indeed, recent theoretical (Dubey 
and Geanakoplos, 2010) and field work (Jalava et al., 2015) shows that students are driven by 
                                                 
 
3 Various methods have been used to induce saliency of group identity in economics experiments. Chen and Li 
(2009) provide an excellent literature review on group identity.  
4 The effect of salient group identity on individual behavior has been examined in nonstrategic tasks (Chen and Li, 
2009), as well as strategic tasks such as public goods games (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), bargaining games 
(McLeish and Oxoby, 2011), prisoner’s dilemma games (Charness et al., 2007), and group conflicts (Cason et al., 
2012). 
4 
 
 
non-monetary prizes in form of a rank-based test scores. Moreover, there is substantial 
experimental literature documenting that non-pecuniary incentives in the form of status 
(Charness et al., 2013; Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 2015), recognition (Andreoni and Petrie, 
2004; Samek and Sheremeta, 2014) and non-monetary rewards (Sheremeta, 2010; Price and 
Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014) are effective at inducing more competitive 
behavior. Therefore, we hypothesized that competition between students within the same 
university is motivated by the “desire to win” measured by the value of winning.  
In within-school bidding, we find that when competing against their peers, students 
within Shenzhen University bid more aggressively than students within University Town. In 
between schools bidding, students from Shenzhen University (a lower tier university) bid more 
aggressively when competing against students from University Town (a higher tier university). 
Interpreted through a theoretical model which incorporates both group identity and differential 
value of winning, our data indicate that students at both schools reveal a higher desire to win 
when facing students from the other school, suggesting that group identity impacts competitive 
behavior of students. Further analysis indicates that this result is primarily driven by female 
students at the lower tier university. 
Previous studies have suggested that students are driven by the potential individual 
returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1981; Heckman et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007) 
and social returns (Moretti, 2004). We find that students are also driven by group identity and the 
desire to win. These two factors alone can explain not only the level of competition between 
universities, but also the variation in the level of competition between students within the same 
university. 
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We present the theoretical model and derive the predictions in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures, while Section 4 presents the results. Finally, 
we discuss implications of our results in Section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Predictions 
All-pay auctions are often used to model real life contests when the costs of competing 
are unrecoverable (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Ellingsen, 1991; Baye et al., 1996). In a standard 
two player all-pay auction with complete information, player 1 with higher value of winning 𝑉1 
submits bid 𝑏1 and player 2 with lower value 𝑉2 submits bid 𝑏2. The player who submits the 
highest bid wins the auction and receives the corresponding prize. However, both players have to 
pay their bids irrespectively of who wins the auction (hence the term “all-pay auction”). 
Therefore, player 1’s (similarly player 2’s) payoff function is given by: 
𝜋1(𝑏1, 𝑏2) = {
𝑉1 − 𝑏1           if 𝑏1 > 𝑏2
0 − 𝑏1             if 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑏2
.      (1) 
Hillman and Riley (1989) showed that the mixed strategy equilibrium for the asymmetric 
all-pay auction with complete information and two risk neutral players is characterized by the 
following two equations: 
{
(𝑉2 − 𝑏)𝐺1(𝑏) + (−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺1(𝑏)) = 0            
(𝑉1 − 𝑏)𝐺2(𝑏) + (−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺2(𝑏)) = 𝑉1 − 𝑉2
.     (2) 
Here, 𝐺1(𝑏) is the probability that player 1 bids lower than 𝑏  and 𝐺2(𝑏) the probability that 
player 2 bids lower than 𝑏. 
An intuitive derivation follows. In any equilibrium, the higher value player 1 can always 
bid the lower value 𝑉2 and win, getting 𝑉1 − 𝑉2 with certainty. The lower value player 2 can 
always bid zero and get at least zero. Neither can get more than what they can guarantee because 
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of competition. Equations described by (2) show that in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, 
players must make each other indifferent between what they can get for sure (the right hand side 
of the equation) and what they can get by any bid (the left hand side). From (2), we can solve for 
the equilibrium cumulative distribution functions or the “bidding functions”: 
{
𝐺1(𝑏) =
𝑏
𝑉2
               for 𝑏 ∈ [0, 𝑉2]
𝐺2(𝑏) =
𝑉1−𝑉2+𝑏
𝑉1
     for 𝑏 ∈ [0, 𝑉2]
.       (3) 
Using the equilibrium bidding functions (3), we can calculate the average expected bid by 
player 1 and player 2: 
{
𝐸(𝑏1) =
𝑉2
2
    
𝐸(𝑏2) =
𝑉2
2
𝑉2
𝑉1
 .         (4) 
Note that if players have the same value of winning, i.e., 𝑉1 = 𝑉2 = 𝑉 , then in 
equilibrium both players should randomly choose their bids between 0 and 𝑉, and the average 
bid should be 𝑉/2, resulting in full dissipation of the prize and zero expected payoffs for both 
players. 
Obviously, the actual value of winning may not necessarily be reflected by the pure 
monetary value of the prize (Chen et al., 2015). Instead, it most likely incorporates different non-
monetary considerations, such as the non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010, 2013, 
2015), status (Charness et al., 2013; Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 2015), and recognition 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Samek and Sheremeta, 2014). Moreover, since our experiment is 
conducted at two different universities (Shenzhen University and University Town), group 
identity may also impact individual behavior in the all-pay auction (Chen and Li, 2009; Abbink 
et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Halevy et al., 2012), especially when students from one 
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university compete against students from another university. Our theoretical model considers 
both types of factors simultaneously. 
We begin by noting that students from different universities may have different value of 
winning, 𝑉𝑆 for students at Shenzhen University and 𝑉𝑈 for students at University Town. Also, 
when competing against each other, different universities may have different group identity, 𝐼𝑆 
for students at Shenzhen University and 𝐼𝑈 for students at University Town. We assume that both 
the value of winning and group identity linearly impact individual utility. 
When students from one university compete with students from the same university, we 
should not expect any impact of group identity (𝐼𝑆 = 𝐼𝑈 = 0) on individual behavior. However, 
students at different universities may value winning differently (𝑉𝑆 ≠ 𝑉𝑈). In such a case, at 
Shenzhen University we have an all-pay auction between two symmetric players 𝑆  and 𝑆′ . 
Therefore, the payoff function of player 𝑆 (similarly player 𝑆′) is given by: 
𝜋𝑆𝑆(𝑏𝑆, 𝑏𝑆′) = {
𝑉𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆           if 𝑏𝑆 > 𝑏𝑆′
0 − 𝑏𝑆            if 𝑏𝑆 ≤ 𝑏𝑆′
.      (5) 
Similarly, at University Town we have an all-pay auction between two symmetric players 𝑈 and 
𝑈′. Therefore, the payoff function of player 𝑈 (similarly player 𝑈′) is given by: 
𝜋𝑈𝑈(𝑏𝑈, 𝑏𝑈′) = {
𝑉𝑈 − 𝑏𝑈          if 𝑏𝑈 > 𝑏𝑈′
0 − 𝑏𝑈            if 𝑏𝑈 ≤ 𝑏𝑈′
.      (6) 
When students from one university compete against students from another university, in 
addition to different values of winning (𝑉𝑆 ≠ 𝑉𝑈), we should expect more competitive behavior 
against students from another university (𝐼𝑆 > 0 and 𝐼𝑈 > 0) due to identity enhanced hostile 
behavior towards out-group members (Abbink et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Halevy et al., 
2012). In such a case, we have an all-pay auction between two asymmetric players 𝑆 (a student 
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from Shenzhen University) and 𝑈 (a student from University Town). Player 𝑆’s payoff function 
is given by: 
𝜋𝑆𝑈(𝑏𝑆, 𝑏𝑈) = {
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆           if 𝑏𝑆 > 𝑏𝑈
0 − 𝑏𝑆                     if 𝑏𝑆 ≤ 𝑏𝑈
.     (7) 
Similarly, player 𝑈’s payoff function is given by: 
𝜋𝑈𝑆(𝑏𝑆, 𝑏𝑈) = {
𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 − 𝑏𝑈         if 𝑏𝑈 ≥ 𝑏𝑆
0 − 𝑏𝑈                     if 𝑏𝑈 < 𝑏𝑆
.     (8) 
Using the payoff functions (5) through (8) and the equilibrium analysis described in (1) 
through (4) we can derive theoretical predictions for our experiment. Obviously, such predictions 
depend on the assumptions about the value of winning (𝑉𝑆 and 𝑉𝑈) and group identity (𝐼𝑆 and 𝐼𝑈). 
For convenience, we use “bid” to refer to the “average bid” (since the equilibrium bid is defined 
by a mixed strategy). Also, for convenience, 𝑏𝑆𝑆, 𝑏𝑆𝑈, 𝑏𝑈𝑆, and 𝑏𝑈𝑈 refer to the average bids by 
Shenzhen University students against Shenzhen University students, Shenzhen University 
students against University Town students, University Town students against Shenzhen 
University students and University Town students against University Town students. Table 1 
provides theoretical predictions based on the assumption that Shenzhen University students and 
University Town students differ in their value of winning the auction (𝑉𝑆  vs. 𝑉𝑈) and group 
identity (𝐼𝑆 vs. 𝐼𝑈). 
For within-school treatments SS and UU, the average bids depend on the relative 
magnitude of values 𝑉𝑆 and 𝑉𝑈. For example, if 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 then it has to be the case that 𝑏𝑆𝑆 > 𝑏𝑈𝑈, 
since 𝑏𝑆𝑆 =
𝑉𝑆
2
 and 𝑏𝑈𝑈 =
𝑉𝑈
2
. Similarly, if 𝑉𝑆 < 𝑉𝑈  then it has to be the case that 𝑏𝑆𝑆 < 𝑏𝑈𝑈 . 
These predictions are shown in the first row of Table 1. The average bids from between schools 
treatments SU and US, however, depend on the joint effect of valuation and identity, 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 and 
𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 . We explain the predictions in Table 1 by providing one example based on the two 
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following assumptions: 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈  and 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈  (i.e., the second column of Table 1). 
Since 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 , equation (4) predicts 𝑏𝑆𝑆 =
𝑉𝑆
2
 and 𝑏𝑈𝑈 =
𝑉𝑈
2
, implying 𝑏𝑆𝑆 > 𝑏𝑈𝑈 . Also, since 
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 , equation (4) predicts 𝑏𝑆𝑈 =
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
2
 and 𝑏𝑈𝑆 =
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
2
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
𝑉𝑆+𝐼𝑆
, implying 𝑏𝑆𝑈 >
𝑏𝑈𝑆 and 𝑏𝑆𝑈 > 𝑏𝑈𝑈. Finally, depending on the exact values of parameters, 𝑏𝑈𝑆 could be >, < or = 
𝑏𝑆𝑆 and 𝑏𝑈𝑈, hence we have <=> in 𝑏𝑆𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑆 and 𝑏𝑈𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑈.  
Table 1: Theoretical Bids by Pairs. 
 Value 𝑉, Identity 𝐼 
School Pairs 
𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 < 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 < 𝑉𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 < 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 < 𝑉𝑈 
𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 
𝑏𝑆𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑈 > > < < 
𝑏𝑆𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑆 < <=> < <=> 
𝑏𝑆𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑆𝑈 <=> <=> <=> < 
𝑏𝑆𝑈 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑈 <=> > <=> > 
𝑏𝑆𝑈 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑆 < > < > 
𝑏𝑈𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑈 > <=> <=> <=> 
 
The entire set of predictions is shown in Table 1. Note that there are two comparisons 
necessary to distinguish one set of assumptions from the rest: 𝑏𝑆𝑆 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑈 and 𝑏𝑆𝑈 vs. 𝑏𝑈𝑆. For 
example, to distinguish 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈  and 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈  from the rest, we need 𝑏𝑆𝑆 > 𝑏𝑈𝑈  and 
𝑏𝑆𝑈 > 𝑏𝑈𝑆. We make use of this fact when we analyze data from our experiment. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We recruited a total of 329 subjects, 167 subjects (97 males, 70 females) from Shenzhen 
University and 162 subjects (62 males, 100 females) from University Town. Subjects were 
paired randomly and anonymously into four pairings: SS (98 subjects), SU (69 subjects), US (68 
subjects), and UU (94 subjects).  
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The experiment was conducted in the standard lecture hall. We gave monitors envelopes 
according to rough estimates of the number of people in each lecture hall. Each envelope 
contained a bidding sheet with instructions (available in Appendix) in which subjects were 
informed that they had 10 CNY and could bid for additional 10 CNY in an all-pay auction. For a 
comparison, a student assistant makes 10-15 CNY per hour. 
On the bidding sheet, subjects could mark a bid ranging from 0 to 10 CNY in 0.5 CNY 
increments. The winner got the prize of 10 CNY. Bids of zero always gave subjects the 
endowment of 10 CNY. We gave subjects 10 examples of bids and corresponding payoffs, 
allowing 2 minutes for questions and answers. There was a place on the bidding sheet for 
students to write down their name and account information. The instructions told the students to 
put the bidding sheet back into the envelope. We transferred payments to their accounts after we 
finished all sessions of the experiment. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Group Identity and the Value of Winning 
Figure 1 shows the average bid in the all-pay auction experiment by school pair. If we 
were to assume that there are no differences in the value of winning between schools (𝑉𝑆 = 𝑉𝑈) 
and group identity (𝐼𝑆 = 𝐼𝑈), then there should be no differences in behavior across four pairs. 
However, this is not what we observe. 
Not only at the aggregate level, but also at the individual level we see the differences in 
behavior of different pairs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of bids by school pair. The standard 
theoretical prediction (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996) is that risk neutral players 
competing for the prize value of 10 should choose their bids randomly from 0 and 10. However, 
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as it can be seen from Figure 2, in all four pairs the distribution of bids is not uniform. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against the theoretical uniform distribution generates p-values less 
than 0.01 for all four pairs. This finding is consistent with the vast experimental literature on all-
pay auctions (Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
Figure 1: Average Bid by School Pair. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Bids by School Pair.
 
Table 2 provides comparison of average bids between different school pairs. We find 
different average bids depending on the pair. Based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, S students 
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against S students (SS) bid significantly more than U students against U students (UU) and 
significantly more than U students against S students (US). Also, we find that S students against 
U students (SU) bid significantly more than U students against U students (UU) and significantly 
more than U students against S students (US). However, we do not find any significant 
differences when comparing SS with SU, or when comparing US with UU. 
Table 2: Comparison of Average Bids between School Pairs. 
Average Bid p-value Sign 
SS vs. UU 0.06 > 
SS vs. US 0.00 > 
SS vs. SU 0.79 = 
SU vs. UU 0.05 > 
SU vs. US 0.00 > 
US vs. UU 0.46 = 
 
We can identify the relative magnitude of the effect from group identity as well as the 
value of winning by fitting the data to the theoretical predictions in Section 2. Note that the 
results in Table 2, i.e., the comparison of average bids by school pairs, are only consistent with 
column two in Table 1, i.e., the theoretical predictions under the assumptions that S has higher 
value of winning, 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈, and the joint effect of the value of winning and group identity is also 
higher for S, that is 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 . Based on such identifications, it is now possible to 
separate the effect of group identity from the value of winning. Recall that group identity only 
affects average bids in across school bidding. Given that 𝑏𝑆𝑆 =
𝑉𝑆
2
= 6.29 and 𝑏𝑈𝑈 =
𝑉𝑈
2
= 5.11, 
we can infer that 𝑉𝑆 = 12.58 and 𝑉𝑈 = 10.22. Given that 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 and 𝑏𝑆𝑈 =
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
2
=
6.43 , we can infer that 𝑉𝑈 + 𝐼𝑈 = 12.86 , which further implies 𝐼𝑈 = 12.86 − 𝑉𝑈 = 2.64 . 
Similarly, given that 𝑏𝑈𝑆 =
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
2
𝑉𝑈+𝐼𝑈
𝑉𝑆+𝐼𝑆
= 4.56, we can infer that 𝑉𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆 = 18.13, which further 
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implies 𝐼𝑆 = 18.13 − 𝑉𝑆 = 5.55. Thus, we conclude that 𝑉𝑆 > 𝑉𝑈 and 𝐼𝑆 > 𝐼𝑈 , implying higher 
value of winning as well as higher group identity for students at Shenzhen University. 
 
4.2. Gender Differences 
In our experiment, we also recorded the gender of all participants. It has been well 
documented that gender plays an important role in competitive environments. For example, when 
choosing to be rewarded by a tournament payment scheme or a piece-rate, women tend to choose 
the piece-rate over the tournament (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cason et al., 2010; 
Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2015). However, in auctions and 
contests, women actually bid more than men (Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Chen et 
al., 2013; Mago et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Price and Sheremeta, 2015). Therefore, Figure 3 
splits the average bid in the all-pay auction by school pair and gender. 
Figure 3: Average Bid by School Pair and Gender. 
  
We find significant differences between males and females in Shenzhen University, with 
women bidding significantly more than men (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.07 for SS pairs 
and p-value=0.06 for SU pairs). This is consistent with the previous findings in the auction and 
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contest literature. The behavior of men and women is more similar in University Town 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.29 for US pairs and p-value=0.68 for UU pairs). 
Table 3: Comparison of Average Bids between School Pairs of Females. 
Average Bid p-value Sign 
SS vs. UU 0.07 > 
SS vs. US 0.00 > 
SS vs. SU 0.53 = 
SU vs. UU 0.03 > 
SU vs. US 0.00 > 
US vs. UU 0.80 = 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Average Bids between School Pairs of Males. 
Average Bid p-value Sign 
SS vs. UU 0.44 = 
SS vs. US 0.12 = 
SS vs. SU 0.79 = 
SU vs. UU 0.30 = 
SU vs. US 0.08 > 
US vs. UU 0.29 = 
 
Following the same estimation procedure done in Table 2, we provide comparison of 
average bids between different school pairs of females in Table 3 and of males in Table 4. We 
find exactly the same treatment effects for females (compare signs in Table 2 and Table 3) but 
not for males (compare signs in Table 2 and Table 4). This suggests that our main treatment 
effects may be moderated by gender. Therefore, we conduct a regression analysis. 
 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
To check the robustness of our findings, we provide an additional regression analysis. 
Table 5 reports OLS regressions with robust standard errors, where the dependent variable is bid, 
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and the independent variables are pairing dummies SS, SU and US. The omitted pairing dummy 
is UU, which serves as a reference point. Regression (1) confirms our earlier finding that 
Shenzhen University students bid more than University Town students independent of the 
identity of the opponent (see the significant coefficients on SS and SU). However, when we 
include the interactions of pairs with female dummy in regression (2), the significance 
disappears. Now, only the interactions SS×F and SU×F are significant, suggesting that our main 
treatment effects come from female students. 
Table 3: OLS Regressions. 
Bid (1) (2) 
SS 1.17** 0.52 
 (0.51) (0.76) 
SU 1.32** 0.78 
 (0.55) (0.77) 
US -0.55 -1.05 
 (0.58) (0.93) 
UU×F  0.21 
  (0.77) 
SS×F  1.62** 
  (0.64) 
SU×F  1.97*** 
  (0.63) 
US×F  0.94 
  (0.91) 
Constant 5.11*** 4.99*** 
 (0.39) (0.55) 
N 329 329 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 
10% level, ** significant at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We examine how salient group identity, created through competition between students 
from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning impact students’ 
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competitive behavior. First, we find that when competing against their peers, students within the 
lower tier university bid more aggressively than students within the top-tier university. Second, 
we find that when competing against students from the other university, students from the lower 
tier university bid more aggressively than students from the top-tier university. Our data, 
interpreted through a theoretical model, indicate that students at the lower tier university have 
stronger group identity as well as higher desire to win. 
Our results show that salient group identity, created through competition between 
students from different universities, impacts students’ competitive behavior. One implication of 
this result is that, depending on the objective, the university may want to enhance their school 
identity by comparing their outcomes with other universities. This can be done, for example, if 
the objective is to improve the performance of a sports team or to increase the volume of blood 
donation on campus. 
Perhaps a more surprising finding of our study is that students at the lower tier university, 
especially women, have a higher desire to win than students at the top-tier university. One way 
of interpreting our findings is that lower status individuals (lower school tier students or women 
in China) derive particular satisfaction from winning against higher status individuals (higher 
school tier students or men). It is also possible that women, especially in China, where families 
traditionally prefer boys (Attané, 2009), may suffer from low academic status and thus may be 
more willing to pay to win because they have a higher demand for status (Charles et al., 2009). 
Finally, it is possible that students at the lower tier university may have different social 
preferences which could impact their competitive behavior against others (Mago et al., 2015). 
Irrespective of the exact interpretation, our findings suggest that winning can be considered as a 
substitute for status or competitive social preferences. 
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